






Risk Taking and the Quality of 
Informal Insurance: Gambling and 
Remittances in Thailand 
 













































  1 
 
Risk Taking and the Quality of Informal Insurance:   
 
Gambling and Remittances in Thailand* 
 
 
Douglas L. Miller 
University of California, Davis 
 
 
Anna L. Paulson 










More than 35% of Thai households either give or receive remittances, and remittances account 
for about one-third of the income of the receiving households.  Remittance relationships may be 
an important source of protection against adverse events for the individuals involved.  This paper 
provides evidence that remittances behave in a way that is consistent with insurance: they are 
sensitive to shocks to regional rainfall and they respond to household level events.  The paper 
goes on to consider how the quality of insurance that is offered through remittances affects 
household risk taking behavior.  Specifically, we show that the likelihood and the amount of 
gambling increase with the quality of informal insurance.  The findings suggest that households 
who are more insured shift their portfolios toward riskier investments.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we examine two issues related to gambling, risk, and informal insurance.  
First, we document that remittance relationships can serve as an important channel for informal 
insurance.  Using data from Thailand, we show that individuals adjust their remittances to 
account for unexpected shocks.  Second, we document that the quality of this informal insurance 
affects household decisions.  In particular, we find that better insurance leads households to 
make less conservative choices.  We do so by examining the impacts of informal insurance on 
gambling expenditures. 
For many economists gambling is a puzzling behavior.  It can be thought of as a financial 
transaction with two undesirable properties: negative expected returns and uncertainty.  One 
standard approach to understanding gambling has been to focus on local convexities in the 
income-utility relationship (Friedman and Savage 1948, Hartley and Farrell, 2002).  A common 
alternative is to model gambling as a direct consumption good in its own right (Johnson et al, 
1999).  One strand of the empirical literature has focused on whether gambling demand responds 
in ways that are consistent with economic rationality (Garrett and Sobel, 1999, Kearney, 2005).  
Our paper contributes to this literature, by showing that gambling is systematically related to 
insurance opportunities. 
In addition to being of direct interest, gambling behavior may shed light on risk-taking 
behavior more generally. A defining feature of the individual decision making problem is 
dealing with risk.  In general, uninsured risk can cause households to make conservative and 
often inefficient choices.  This issue can be particularly relevant for developing countries, which 
are often characterized by extensive risk, a lack of formal insurance and imperfect informal  
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insurance (See Dercon 2005 (and the cites therein) for an excellent overview of the evidence).  
This suggests that households may allocate resources more efficiently if better insurance were 
available, and there is an on-going policy debate about whether access to formal insurance can 
be expanded without crowding out private, informal insurance.  There is an extensive literature 
that documents how the magnitude of risk (rainfall variability, financial crises, health shocks, 
etc.) affects household decisions and provides indirect evidence that mechanisms to help people 
cope with risk (i.e. insurance) would be beneficial (see for example: Beegle et al, 2003, Jacoby 
and Skoufias, 1997, Kochar, 1995, Morduch, 2005, Paulson, 2003, Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 
and Thomas et al, 2004). 
In this paper, motivated by the broader questions of insurance and risk, we focus our 
attention on these issues through the lens of remittances and gambling.  Specifically, we examine 
how the likelihood and the extent of gambling (buying government lottery tickets or playing a 
related underground numbers game) responds to the quality of informal insurance offered 
through remittances.  One advantage to looking at gambling is its prevalence.  Every two weeks 
in Thailand, approximately 27 million government lottery tickets are sold for 40 baht a piece 
which yield gross annual revenues to the government of approximately $648 million.   More than 
40% of households surveyed in the 1988 and 1990 Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES) report 
positive expenditures on gambling in the month before the survey.   Gambling accounts for 
approximately 4% of total monthly expenditures among households with positive gambling 
expenditures.  A second (and presumably related) advantage to studying gambling is that only 
small expenditures are required to buy lottery tickets, so this activity is unlikely to be influenced  
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by financial market imperfections.
1   Finally, data on gambling is widely available in large 
household surveys that include detailed information on expenditures.   
As noted above, playing the government lottery has a negative expected return. Hence, it 
is not directly encouraging (from an efficiency perspective) to find that gambling increases with 
the quality of informal insurance.  However, there is evidence that gambling reveals important 
components of behavior that are likely to influence other more productive decisions that are 
more difficult to observe, especially in environments where financial market imperfections are 
important.  Binswanger (1980) estimated risk parameters for rural Indian farmers through a 
series of lottery-like games (using real money).  The estimated risk parameters are systematically 
related to agricultural decisions (Binswanger et. al, 1980).  Farmers whose lottery choices 
indicate that they are more risk averse choose more conservative agricultural options.  In a study 
of the effect of the effect of liquidity constraints on self-employment, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) 
find that people who have won the lottery are more likely to become entrepreneurs.  Their 
interpretation of this result emphasizes the role of lottery winnings in overcoming liquidity 
constraints.  Alternatively, their findings may be interpreted to suggest that, in the presence of 
liquidity constraints, playing the lottery is correlated with other risky investment activities like 
starting a business.  
The informal insurance mechanism that we examine is remittances.  More than 35% of 
Thai households either give or receive remittances and remittances account for about one-third 
of the income of the average receiving household. We show that remittances behave in a way 
that is largely consistent with insurance: they are sensitive to shocks to regional rainfall and they 
                                                 
1 Paulson and Townsend (2004) and Paulson, Townsend and Karaivanov (2006) show that financial market 
imperfections place important constraints on entrepreneurial activity in rural and semi-urban Thailand.  
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also respond to the circumstances of the sending and receiving households.  The paper goes on to 
examine how the quality of informal insurance that is available through remittances affects 
household behavior.  Specifically, we examine how the quality of insurance affects the 
probability and the amount of gambling done by households that either send or receive 
remittances. 
We use the correlation pattern of annual shocks to provincial rainfall to measure the 
quality of insurance available through remittances.  The lower the correlation between shocks to 
the sending and the receiving household, the more likely the sending household is to be in a 
position to help the receiving household in stressful times.  Consider the case of two households 
who live in provinces with perfectly negatively correlated rainfall.  Suppose each household has 
income of 100 half the time and zero income the other half of the time.  Because the income 
shocks to each household are perfectly negatively correlated, one household will always have 
income of 100 while the other household has zero income.  If the household with high income 
sends half of it to the other household then they will both be perfectly insured: every period their 
post-remittance income will be 50. So long as income shocks to the two provinces are not 
perfectly correlated, the two households will be able to partially insure themselves via 
remittances. 
It is important to note that remittances could be driven by many different underlying 
motivations, and yet still provide insurance opportunities.  Even if remittances have a strategic or 
contractual component, to insure future inheritances or to repay parents for educational 
investments, for example, they can still have an important insurance component.  So long as the 
timing and the amount of payments are sensitive to shocks faced by the remitting and the  
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receiving household, they will help the extended family smooth consumption.  Many informal 
contracts in developing countries appear to provide insurance together with other services.   
Ligon (1998) finds evidence of insurance in long-term sharecropping arrangements in India.  
Udry (1990) reports that the timing and the amount of repayment on informal loans in Northern 
Nigeria varies as a function the circumstances of both the lending and the borrowing household.  
 Lillard and Willis (1997) find that probability and the amount of remittances from Malaysian 
children to their parents are sensitive to the current and permanent income of the child’s family.  
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) document that marriage arrangements in rural India are impacted 
by insurance concerns. 
We find that remittances between Thai households have an insurance component.  In 
particular, remittances are significantly higher when the receiver’s province experiences a 
negative shock.  We also find suggestive evidence that remitters also share lottery winnings (and 
losses) with the houses they remit to.  Further, households receive higher remittances when their 
medical expenses are higher.  In addition, we find that risk taking behavior responds to the 
quality of insurance that is available to them.  Households who remit are more likely to gamble 
and gamble more the higher the potential quality of insurance between the sending and the 
receiving province. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the empirical models 
and summarizes the household and regional data that is used in the analysis.  In section 3, the 
evidence that remittances provide insurance is examined.  Given that evidence, section 4 
describes how the quality of insurance affects the likelihood and the extent of gambling by 
households that send or receive remittances.  The final section concludes.   
  7 
 
2.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
2.1  Empirical model for response of remittances to income shocks 
The paper draws on two types of data: cross-sectional information on Thai households, 
and panel data on rainfall for Thailand’s 73 provinces. The provincial level time series data on 
rainfall are used to estimate the correlation structure of provincial shocks.   
The first objective of this paper is to examine the ability of remittances to provide an 
insurance component. To do this, we will estimate an equation of the following form 
 
ipq pq q p iq ip ipq DIST RAINSHOCK RAINSHOCK Z X REMIT ε δ δ δ γ β + + + + + = 1 1 1  (1) 
 
where  ipq REMIT  is the amount of cash and value of goods remitted from household i in 
province p to province q,  ip X  is a set of characteristics of the remitting household,  iq Z  is a set of 
characteristics of the receiving household, RAINSHOCK  is a measure of the rainfall shock that 
is common to households living in a given province, and  pq DIST  is a measure of the distance 
between the two provinces.  We estimate this model using data on individuals who report giving 
a remittance.  In this specification we are interested in the coefficients on the rainfall shocks, as 
well on those X's which are plausibly related to unexpected income or expenditure shocks 
(lottery winnings and household medical expenses). 
We also estimate an analogous model for households that report receiving remittances: 
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ipq pq q p ip iq ipq DIST RAINSHOCK RAINSHOCK Z X RECEIVE ε δ δ δ γ β + + + + + = 1 1 1 . (2) 
 
In order to estimate (1) and (2), we need to construct provincial level shocks.  To do this, we 
use annual rainfall (1960-1990) collected at 61 meteorological stations throughout Thailand.  
The rainfall data are collected by the Meteorological Department of the Ministry of 
Communications.
2  Annual rainfall shocks are constructed by subtracting the long run average 
for each province from each annual observation. 
2.2  Empirical model for the effect of insurance on risk-taking 
The second goal of the paper is to examine how the quality of informal insurance affects 
the household's risk-taking behavior.  We estimate the following model: 
 
ipq p pq pq ip ipq DIST INSURANCE X RISKINESS ε γ δ δ β + + + + = 1 1 .    (3) 
 
Here RISKINESS is a measure of the risk-taking activity of household i in province p in 
a remittance relationship with someone in province q, X is a set of household level control 
variables, INSURANCE is our measure of the inter-province insurance opportunities, and  p γ  is 
a set of province dummy variables. 
In order to estimate model (3), we need to construct a measure of the inter-province 
insurance opportunities.  To do so, we compute the correlation matrix of the rainfall shocks.  The 
potential for remittances to provide insurance depends on the correlation of shocks to the sending 
                                                 
2 Provinces without rainfall stations are assumed to have the same rainfall as the nearest province for which data is 
available.  
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and the receiving household.  The lower the correlation between shocks to the sending and the 
receiving household, the more likely the sending household is to be in a position to help the 
receiving household in stressful times.  The correlation between shocks to two provinces 
provides an estimate of the potential "quality" of the insurance that can be delivered via 
remittances.   
Using the same rainfall data and observations on household income from the Thai SES, 
Paxson (1992) finds a strong relationship between rainfall and the income of rice farmers: their 
mean income would increase by 13% if rainfall were one standard deviation above the mean 
from April to June.  Distance data is also collected at the provincial level.  The distance in 
kilometers between the capital of the sending household’s province and the capital of the 
province that the receiving household lives in provides a proxy for the costs of remitting and 
monitoring the activities of the extended family.   
2.3  Description of household data 
The 1988 and 1990 Thai Socio-Economic Surveys (SES) provide the household level 
data used in this paper.  The Thai SES records data for 11,045 households in 1988 and 13,177 
households in 1990.  The survey includes detailed consumption and income information for each 
of the surveyed households, as well as the age, education, occupation and earnings of each 
household member.  In addition, there is information on household physical asset holdings as 
well as changes in financial asset holdings in the month prior to the survey.   
If someone in the surveyed household reports sending money or goods to someone 
outside the household during the twelve months prior to the survey, the household is considered  
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a remitter.
3  Receiving households are analogously defined.  If a surveyed household receives a 
remittance, the value of the transfer, how it was delivered and whether it was for educational 
purposes are recorded.  In addition, the survey reports the sender’s province, occupation, 
industry, community type (rural, urban, and foreign) as well as the relationship of the sender and 
the receiver.  There are similar data about the receiver if someone in the surveyed household 
sends a transfer. The empirical work examines only domestic transfers. 
Table 1 summarizes the data by remittance status.  The income of households who send 
remittances is roughly twice that of households who receive remittances.  In addition, the 
transfers recorded in the SES flow from households who are headed by people who, on average, 
have three years more schooling and are thirteen years younger than the heads of recipient 
households.  Households who receive remittances are also less likely to be headed by men, 60% 
versus 83%.   
Table 1 also describes the regional and occupational distribution of the sample by 
remittance status.  Receivers are over-represented in the very poor northeastern region of 
Thailand, while remitters are more likely to live in Bangkok.  Remitters are also more likely to 
be entrepreneurs and professionals than are households who receive transfers.  Receiving 
households, on the other hand, are likely to farm or be economically inactive.
4   
There is a strong life-cycle component to remittances, which suggests that they play an 
important role in old age support.  Figure 1 describes the percentage of households who send and 
                                                 
3 More recent Thai Socio-Economic Surveys do not include remittance modules that are the source of crucial 
variables for our study. 
4 Most "economically inactive" households receive property income.  In rural areas, this income is typically equal to 
some fraction of the rice harvest from land that has been rented out.  So despite being "economically inactive" the 
income of these households is subject to the same rainfall risk as their neighbors.  
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receive remittances as a function of the age of the head of the household.
5  The percentage of 
households that remit is around 40% when the head of the household is 20 years old.  This figure 
falls as the head ages, dropping to around 5% by age 70.  The percentage of households who 
receive remittances falls from 26% to 12% from age 20 to age 35.  Then it rises steadily as the 
household head ages.  At age 50 approximately 20% of households receive remittances, and by 
age 70 approximately 40% of households receive remittances.  The fraction of inactive 
households who receive remittances is high for all ages.   
Table 2 documents the importance of remittances in supplementing the income of 
receiving households.
6  Remittances account for almost one-third of the income of receivers, and 
sending households remit 19% of their income on average.  While remitters report doing so to 
help pay for educational expenses more than 30% of the time, only 10% of receiving households 
report that the remittance was intended for this purpose.  This is likely to be a feature of who was 
included in the sample, rather than evidence of moral hazard.  The number of people who 
actually receive remittances for educational purposes is likely to be much higher than reported in 
the survey, since the institutional population (students living in dormitories, for example) is not 
included in the sample.  The fraction of remittances designated for educational purposes is 
consistent with the fraction received from parents (in the case of households who received a 
remittance) and with the fraction of households giving to sons or daughters (in the case of 
households who gave a remittance). 
                                                 
5 This Figure pools 1988 and 1990 data.  We estimate locally linear non-parametric regressions, using an 
Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of one year. 
6 For Table 2 we drop those observations where reported monthly remittances exceed monthly income.  We do so 
because we are concerned that these indicate misreported data, as remittances received should be considered as part 
of income.  For remittances sent, we use a similar exclusion rule for consistency.  This results in a loss of 254 out of 
5223 receivers, and 78 out of 3863 remitters.  
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Almost 60% of remittances were delivered in person.  This suggests that the distance 
between the sending and the receiving province may be an appropriate proxy for the transaction 
cost associated with remitting and monitoring the activities of the receiving household.   
Tables 3.A and 3.B describe gambling expenditures and receipts.  Fifty-two percent of 
households who send remittances play the lottery compared to 39% of households who receive 
remittances (see Table 3.A).
7  Sending households who play the lottery bet almost twice as much 
as receiving households per month.  Winnings make up a greater fraction of income for the 
sending households as well: 10% compared to 7% for receiving households.  
 
3.  REMITTANCE ESTIMATES 
In this section we provide evidence that remittances have characteristics of informal 
insurance.  If remittances act as insurance then they should offset shocks to the sending and 
receiving households.  One measure of shocks to the sending and the receiving households is 
captured by regional conditions in the places where they live.  When the recipient lives in a 
region that experiences a bad shock, remittances should be higher to make up for this hardship.  
When the remitter lives in a region that experiences adverse conditions, remittances should be 
scaled back.  Similarly, we expect remittances to be higher when the sending region experiences 
especially favorable conditions and lower when the receiving province gets a good shock. The 
regressors include a dummy variable that is equal to one when the sending province experiences 
below average rainfall and a similar dummy variable for below average rainfall in the receiving 
province.  
                                                 
7 Kearney (2005) finds that 51% of US Adults in 1998 reported playing the lottery in the last year.  In this regard, US 
and Thai households are not dramatically different.  
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In addition to providing insurance for aggregate regional shocks, remittances may also 
provide insurance for idiosyncratic shocks – job loss or illness, for example.
8 We would expect 
that households who experience unusually good conditions to send higher remittances (or receive 
lower remittances).  Households with particularly bad outcomes may receive higher remittances 
(or reduce the remittances that they send).  It is difficult to accurately measure “unusually” good 
or bad household conditions from cross-sectional data.  The data do not provide a benchmark for 
what is “usual” for the household.  Despite these difficulties, expenditures on medicine and 
medical services are also included in the remittance regressions as a potential measure of 
idiosyncratic household shocks.    
Lottery winnings are also included in the remittance regressions.  Winning the lottery is 
always “unusual” in the sense that it is determined by a random draw. The remittance estimates 
include net gambling winnings (gross winnings – expenses). If idiosyncratic shocks are insured 
through remittances then we would expect households to send remittances to offset gambling 
winnings and losses.  Households should send higher remittances when they have lottery 
winnings and lower their remittances when they have losses.  Similarly, receiving households 
should receive smaller remittances when they win the lottery and higher remittances when they 
lose. 
Table 4.A presents estimates of average monthly remittances for households who sent a 
cash or in-kind remittance during the twelve months prior to the survey.
9   The regression 
incorporates some characteristics of the receiving household as well as the income and other 
                                                 
8 Demand for insurance via remittances against idiosyncratic risk may be smaller than demand for insurance against 
regional risk.  Since regional risk by definition affects many households in the region, these households may be 
unable to insure one another.  By contrast, insurance against idiosyncratic risk may be cheaply available in local 
areas.   
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characteristics of the sending household.  Older, urban remitters send significantly larger 
transfers.  Remittances that are targeted to urban areas, to the sending household’s children and 
to more distant households are also higher.  Remittances that are delivered in person are lower.  
Higher income also leads to significantly higher remittances.  If the sending household’s income 
were to increase by 1000 baht ($40), remittances would go up by 101 baht ($4.04).  There is 
suggestive evidence (significant at the 10% level) that remittances are positively correlated with 
lottery winnings. 
Controlling for these and other factors, remittances are significantly higher when the 
receiving household lives in a province that experienced below average rainfall in the year prior 
to the survey.  When the province of the receiving household experiences adverse conditions, 
remittances are about 127 baht ($5.08) higher.  This is equal to 13% of average monthly cash 
remittances in the 12 months prior to the survey. We also predict that remittances will be lower 
when the sending province receives a negative shock.  However, in the estimates of remittances 
sent, a negative shock to the sending province does not significantly affect the level of 
transfers.
10 
Table 4.B presents a similar regression for households who reported receiving a cash or 
in-kind remittance during the twelve months prior to the survey.  When the receiving household 
lives in a province that experienced a bad shock, remittances go up by 250 baht ($10), which is 
equal to 25% of the average monthly per capita income of households who receive remittances.  
Further, remittances do appear to provide insurance for illness.  If medical expenditures increase, 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 As in Table 2, we drop observations where reported monthly cash remittances are greater than monthly income. 
10 One possibility is that the per capita income measure, being visible to the remitter, incorporates any impacts of 
negative rainfall shock.  Another possibility is that rainfall shocks capture conditions in the receiving region (often 
rural) more accurately than they do in the sending region (often urban).   
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remittances increase to cover 8.2% of the increased expenditure.  Illness is likely to be of 
particular importance to households who receive remittances since they are often elderly.  
Male-headed households receive smaller remittances.   We find suggestive evidence that 
households with higher per capita income (net of remittances) also receive smaller remittances.  
This type of result is typically interpreted as evidence in favor of altruistic motives for remitting 
(see Cox 1987, for example).  It is important to note that this result is consistent with many 
motives for remitting – so long as the remittances offer some insurance.   
It is interesting to note that households with more educated heads receive higher 
remittances.  One additional year of schooling leads to an increase in remittances of 68 baht 
($2.76).  It is possible that this variable captures characteristics of the sending household.  More 
educated parents are likely to have children who also have relatively more schooling and 
therefore higher income that would result in larger remittances.   Farm households receive lower 
remittances, while urban households and households that live further from the sending province 
receive higher remittances.  Households that own their home and land also receive much higher 
remittances – remittances are 279 baht ($11.16) higher for households who own their home and 
land.  Strategic motives for remittances – remitting in order to ensure a bequest – would be 
consistent with this result.   
Whatever the motive for remitting, the remittances themselves appear to have an 
insurance component that is sensitive to both aggregate and idiosyncratic measures of shocks.  In 
particular, remittances are higher when the sending household’s income is higher and lower 
when the receiving household’s income is higher.  They are also higher when the province where 
the receiving household lives has below average rainfall.   Finally, receiving households receive  
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higher remittances when they have higher medical expenditures, and sending households send 
more when they have greater lottery winnings.  This evidence suggests that remittances are used 
to insure a combination of events – some of which would be public and easily verifiable, like 
provincial rainfall conditions, and others that would be private.  
 
4.  GAMBLING, INCOME AND THE OF QUALITY OF INSURANCE  
Given the evidence that remittances between Thai households appear to provide some 
insurance against both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, this section of the paper examines 
whether the provision of this insurance affects household decisions.  If households adjust their 
risk taking behavior in response to informal insurance, then as the quality of insurance offered 
through remittances increases they will be more likely to gamble, and to gamble more.   
Equivalently, households will be less likely to gamble, and gamble less, the higher the 
correlation of shocks to the sending and the receiving household.  
 
Estimates of the Probability and the Extent of Gambling 
Table 5.A presents several specifications related to gambling expenditures for remitting 
households.  The first column present results from a Probit regression with positive gambling 
expenditures as the outcome of interest.  The coefficients reported in the column present the 
estimated change in the probability of gambling associated with an infinitesimal change in the 
independent variable.  If the independent variable is discrete, dF/dx is for the discrete change in 
the dummy variable from 0 to 1.  The second and third columns present results from regression 
specifications.  The second column has gambling expenditures divided by food expenditures as  
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the outcome variable of interest.  The third column normalizes by total expenditures instead.  
The last two columns are Tobit specifications with gambling-to-food-expenditures and 
gambling-to-total-expenditures as the outcome variables.  Table 5.B presents the analogous 
estimates for receiving households. 
The independent variables include per capita income, a dummy variable for male 
household head, the age and age squared of the household head, the years of schooling of the 
household head, household size, and a dummy variable if the household lives in an urban area.  
The distance in kilometers between the sending and the receiving province is also included in an 
effort to measure the cost of enforcing and monitoring the implicit insurance contract. 
The estimates also include a measure of the quality of insurance that is offered through 
remittances, the correlation of shocks between the sending and the receiving household. The 
correlation is the correlation of rainfall shocks between the two provinces.  The average 
correlation for remitters is 0.317 (s.d. = 0.519) and the average correlation for receivers is 0.345 
(s.d. = 0.522).  Dummy variables for each of Thailand’s provinces are also included.  Their 
inclusion is intended to rule out the possibility that the correlation variable picks up some other 
spatial variation that is associated with gambling.
11 
Higher income is not strongly associated with gambling expenditures for remitting 
households (Table 5.A).  Sending households are much more likely to gamble, and gamble more, 
                                                 
11 Our measure of insurance quality is an inter-province shock correlation, and our specifications include province 
dummy variables.  Therefore the coefficient on insurance quality is picking up within-province variation in shock 
correlation.  We are concerned about the extent to which the overall variation in insurance quality is within-province 
versus between-province.  If it were mostly between-province, then we would be more hesitant in interpreting the 
correlation of our outcome variables with the (small amount of) within-province variation in insurance quality.  To 
explore this, we regress insurance quality on a full set of province dummies, for receiving households and for 
remitting households.  For receiving households, the R-squared is 0.117, and for remitting households the R-squared 
is 0.071.  For both groups, therefore, the bulk of the variation in insurance quality comes from within-province, and 
so we proceed with confidence on this front.  
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if they have a male head.  Older household heads are more also significantly more likely to 
report gambling expenditures, although the propensity to gamble mitigates with age.  Education 
has no effect on the likelihood of reporting gambling expenditures, and is negatively associated 
with the share of gambling expenditures. 
Households are more likely to gamble the larger the household, but do not gamble larger 
amounts.  Presumably this captures the fact that bigger households have more people who may 
have gambled in the month prior to the survey.  Urban dwellers are much more likely to gamble 
than their rural counterparts.  Among remitting households, urban dwellers are 20 percentage 
points more likely to gamble.  The distance between the sending and the receiving household has 
no impact on the probability of gambling for either receiving or remitting households.  One 
interpretation of this result is that distance does not accurately capture the enforcement costs 
associated with remittances. 
For households who send remittances, the quality of insurance appears to have a 
significant impact on gambling expenditures.  When the quality of insurance is higher (the 
correlation between shocks to the sending and the receiving provinces is lower), the household 
gambles more.  If a remitting household were in a position to offer perfect insurance (correlation 
= -1), the probability that they would gamble would be 7.6 percentage points higher compared to 
a case where they could offer very good insurance (correlation = 0).
12  The point estimate from 
the Probit specification is meaningfully large, but does not rise to conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  However, for the expenditure share specifications, the results are 
significantly negative ranging from the 5% level (when normalized by total expenditures) to the 
                                                 
12 At the mean correlation, a one standard deviation increase in the correlation of shocks to the sending and the 
receiving province, an increase of 0.519, would lead to a decrease in the probability of gambling of 3.94 percentage  
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10% level (when normalized by food expenditures). We interpret this evidence, along with the 
patterns of remittances that were revealed in Tables 4A and 4B, as suggesting that risk-taking 
behavior responds to insurance opportunities. 
Table 5.B presents results for receiving households.  Here we see similar age, gender, 
urban, and household size patterns, and similar patterns with distance between households.  In 
contrast to the remitters, we find that schooling is not strongly related to gambling, and that 
income is positively related to gambling in most of the specifications. 
For receiving households, the quality of insurance appears to have no impact on the 
probability that the household gambles.  The point estimate on correlation of province shocks is 
about half the magnitude of that for remitters, and in contrast to the case for remitters the 
confidence interval includes meaningfully large positive impacts as a possibility.  The 
specifications looking at levels of gambling offer mixed evidence.  For the specifications 
normalizing by food expenditures, there is modest evidence (significant at the 10% level) that 
gambling levels increase with better insurance.  However, this evidence is not robust to 
normalizing by total expenditures. 
Taken as a whole, our estimates suggest that the quality of insurance is important in 
determining the probability and amount of spending on gambling by remitting households.   
Remitting households gamble less the higher the correlation between the sending and the 
receiving households.  Equivalently, they gamble more the higher the quality of insurance.   
Remitters with perfect insurance would spend 0.6 to 2.1 percentage points more on gambling as 
a percentage of total expenditures, compared to remitters with a correlation of zero.  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
points.  This is a decrease of 7.6% from the average likelihood of gambling for remitters of 52%.    
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corresponds to a 26% - 93% increase in gambling expenditures relative to the average of 2.27%. 
 For receiving households, gambling expenditures are not significantly related to the quality of 
insurance. 
 
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper provides evidence that remittances between Thai households have an 
insurance component.  In particular, remittances are significantly higher when the receiver’s 
province experiences a negative shock.  Remitters also share lottery winnings (and losses) with 
the households they remit to and households receive higher remittances when their medical 
expenses are higher. We also find that remittances are lower when the receiving household’s 
income is higher. In addition, we have shown that households who remit are more likely to 
gamble, and gamble more, the higher the potential quality of insurance between the sending and 
the receiving province.  The impact of insurance on gambling expenditures is particularly 
notable. 
There are several policy implications that we derive from our findings.  First, the fact that 
remittances provide an insurance component to the parties involved has implications for policy 
related to remittances.  Policies that increase costs of remitting may reduce the insurance 
available to households.  Alternatively, providing public goods that reduce the costs of 
remittances (improved information and financial infrastructure) may increase households' 
insurance opportunities.  Second, the fact that risk taking behavior responds to insurance implies 
that policies or programs that improve the insurance opportunities available to households may 
result in greater engagement with risky investment.  If the current situation involves a sub- 
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optimal degree of risky investment, then increased insurance opportunities may be welfare 
enhancing.  
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Notes:   Data are 24,222 observations from 1988 and 1990 Thailand Socio-Economic Surveys.  
Graphs are non-parametric locally weighted linear regressions, using an Epanechnikov kernel 
and a bandwidth of 1 year. 
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TABLE 1 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY REMITTANCE STATUS 
Give = 0,  Give = 0,  Give = 1,   Give = 1,    
Get = 0 Get = 1 Get = 0  Get = 1
# Household  15590 4769 3409 454
% of Sample  (64.36) (19.69) (14.07) (1.87)
Characteristics of Household      
44.54 52.36 39.27 46.78 Age of head 
(14.22) (16.34) (12.90) (15.03)
5.33 4.71 7.79 7.32 Education of head (years) 
(4.10) (4.11) (4.99) (5.26)
1769.11 1749.27 3550.38 3263.03 Income 
(2529.27) (2519.05) (4926.26) (3761.45)
4.20 3.70 3.29 3.60 Size  
(1.82) (1.89) (1.77) (1.87)
% Male head  82.61% 60.01% 82.63% 61.67%
% Urban  33.98% 31.10% 59.17% 46.92%
Regional Distribution (Percent)      
North  21.61% 22.71% 14.23% 17.18%
Northeast  21.76% 29.86% 14.37% 28.19%
Central  20.80% 19.65% 16.05% 14.54%
South  17.06% 11.07% 16.46% 9.47%




   
Farmers  31.77% 23.19% 11.06% 15.42%
Entrepreneurs  19.87% 11.30% 22.79% 13.88%
Professionals  8.15% 5.26% 16.63% 18.50%
Laborers  10.81% 7.09% 3.67% 1.54%
Other Employees  26.70% 17.40% 43.65% 28.41%
Inactive  2.70% 35.75% 2.20% 22.25%
Notes: "Give" means someone in the household reported giving a cash or in-kind 
remittance during the 12 months preceding the survey.  "Get" means someone in the 
household reported receiving a remittance during the 12 months preceding the survey.  
Income is in 1988 per capita (standardized using adult male equivalents) baht per month 
(25 baht = $1).  "Migrant" means the household has changed amphoes (county) in the last 
ten years.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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TABLE 2 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE REMITTANCES 
   Get = 1 Give = 1 
Delivery Method (%)     
Person to Person Delivery  58.89% 59.50% 
Money Order  27.95% 30.46% 
Other Delivery Method  13.16% 10.04% 
Relationship (%)       
Spouse 14.25% 3.67% 
Son or Daughter  60.33% 30.25% 
Parents 13.18% 54.74% 
Brother or Sister  5.03% 6.10% 
Other 6.22% 5.15% 
% For Education  9.52% 30.12% 
Size of Remittance     
Last Year: Cash/Mo.  1003.73 820.94 
# 4866 3734 
 (1968.83) (1456.93) 
    
Last Year: In-Kind/Mo.  266.00 177.20 
# 635 316 
 (923.45) (314.72) 
    
Last Month: Cash  1428.76 1287.15 
# 3383 2630 
 (2175.82) (1578.67) 
    
Last Month: In-Kind  793.78 802.66 
# 353 176 
 (1477.08) (1338.66) 
Remittance as % of Total Income (last 
Month) 
31.97% 18.62% 
Notes: Remittances are in 1988 baht (25 baht = $1) per household.  See Table 1 for 
definition of "Give" and "Get".  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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TABLE 3.A 
LOTTERY CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY REMITTANCE STATUS 
Give = 0,   Give = 0,   Give = 1,   Give = 1,    
Get = 0  Get = 1  Get = 0  Get = 1 
% who play lottery  40.88% 38.73% 51.75%  53.96%
% who win lottery  6.04% 7.74% 10.88%  16.52%
Lottery Expenditures   
All Households   
   Mean  77.75 61.77 140.43  139.22
   Std deviation  (325.11) (296.94) (637.16)  (362.92)
   % of expenditure  1.57% 1.32% 2.27%  2.02%
Players   
   Mean  190.20336 159.50352 271.38152  257.98776
   Std deviation  (487.03) (460.59) (865.57)  (462.34)
   % of expenditure  3.85% 3.42% 4.39%  3.73%
Lottery Winnings   
All Households   
   Mean  31.33 26.45 71.43  67.72
   Std deviation  (662.98) (246.25) (914.23)  (366.08)
   % of income  0.58% 0.54% 1.04%  0.87%
Winners   
  Mean  518.98 341.82 656.31  409.95
   Std deviation  (2652.57) (823.16) (2704.38)  (823.54)
   % of income  9.53% 6.93% 9.53%  5.29%
 
TABLE 3.B 
LOTTERY CHARACTERISTICS BY INCOME DECILE 
      Bets/Monthly 
Expenses 
Winners Winnings/Monthly  Income 
All  HHs Players All  HHs Players All  HHs Players Winners Income 
Decile 
% who 
play  % % % % % % % 
1  28.23 1.13  4.02  5.37 14.33 0.83  2.31 15.52 
2  31.42 1.14  3.63  5.33 13.93 0.58  1.58 10.83 
3  35.80 1.24  3.46  6.40 14.88 0.72  1.48 11.32 
4  37.74 1.42  3.75  6.56 15.32 0.64  1.55  9.75 
5  42.20 1.59  3.77  7.60 15.07 0.55  1.15  7.24 
6  47.30 1.72  3.63  6.69 12.91 0.54  1.05  8.03 
7  49.17 1.84  3.75  7.93 13.85 0.73  1.35  9.21 
8  51.24 2.03  3.97  9.08 15.87 0.65  1.10  7.19 
9  51.78 2.27  4.39  8.71 15.63 0.69  1.20  7.87 
10  47.44 1.92  4.04  8.84 16.19 0.61  1.22  6.86 
All  42.23 1.63  3.86  7.25 14.85 0.65  1.34  9.01  
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 TABLE 4.A 
 
ESTIMATES OF REMITTANCES FROM THE SURVEYED HOUSEHOLD 
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic
Characteristics of the Sending Household      
Monthly Per Capita Income  0.101  18.630
Age of HH Head  12.072  6.660
Male HH Head  57.364  1.220
Years of Schooling, Head  9.043  2.140
Monthly Lottery Winnings  0.054  1.700
Monthly Per Capita Medical Expenses  0.044  3.240
Farm Household  -61.389  -0.910
Urban Household  85.269  1.890
Own Home and Land  -49.190  -1.030
1990 Survey year  113.608  3.020
Characteristics of Remittance   
Sent to Urban HH  201.377  4.740
Sent to Parents  -89.885  -1.530
Sent to Kids  256.036  3.750
Sent for Educational Purposes  68.854  1.120
Delivered in Person  -135.999  -2.970
Characteristics of Sending and Receiving Provinces   
Rain Shock < 0 to Sending Province  -44.897  -0.860
Rain Shock < 0 to Receiving Province  126.631  2.560
Distance between Sending and Receiving Province  0.176  2.370




Note: Dependent variable is the amount of cash and value of goods remitted per month during the twelve months 
prior to the survey. 
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TABLE 4.B 
 
ESTIMATES OF REMITTANCES TO THE SURVEYED HOUSEHOLD 
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic
Characteristics of the Receiving Household      
Monthly Per Capita Income  -0.026  -1.770
Age of HH Head  3.328  1.710
Male HH Head  -325.096  -6.190
Years of Schooling, Head  67.660  9.160
Monthly Lottery Winnings  -0.042  -0.500
Monthly Per Capita Medical Expenses  0.082  3.470
Farm Household  -276.868  -4.390
Urban Household  503.246  7.880
Own Home and Land  279.393  4.430
1990 Survey year  66.558  1.380
Characteristics of Remittance   
Sent from Urban HH  203.467  3.590
Sent from Parents  -327.624  -3.680
Sent from Kids  -525.713  -7.960
Sent for Educational Purposes  356.075  3.920
Delivered in Person  11.281  0.190
Characteristics of Sending and Receiving Provinces   
Rain Shock < 0 to Sending Province  -69.753  -0.970
Rain Shock < 0 to Receiving Province  249.808  4.020
Distance between Sending and Receiving Province  0.373  3.730




Note: Dependent variable is the amount of cash and value of goods received per month during the twelve months 
prior to the survey. 
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TABLE 5.A 
REMITTERS 




s > 0 
Gambling 
expenditure















s / Total 
expenditure
s 
Independent Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Income per Capita†   -0.011  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.000 
  -(1.53) (2.58) (1.63) (1.35) (0.57) 
Male Household Head  0.398 0.027 0.013 0.084 0.036 
  (6.74) (3.37) (4.06) (5.99) (6.50) 
Age  0.066 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.004 
  (7.03) (1.96) (1.43) (5.03) (4.58) 
Age
2  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  -(6.55) -(1.89) -(1.44) -(4.73) -(4.33) 
Years of Schooling  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  -(0.47) -(2.67) -(3.57) -(2.16) -(2.83) 
Household Size  0.050 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002 
  (3.33) -(0.12) -(0.62) (1.65) (1.28) 
Urban Dummy  0.202 0.015 0.006 0.038 0.015 
  (3.20) (1.74) (1.89) (2.68) (2.79) 
Correlation b/w sending  -0.076 -0.011 -0.006 -0.021 -0.010 
and receiving province  -(1.57)  -(1.67)  -(2.35)  -(1.90)  -(2.40) 
Distance b/w sending  -0.053  -0.011  -0.002  -0.021  -0.006 
and receiving province†  -(0.61) -(0.93) -(0.53) -(1.04) -(0.72) 
1990 Survey*  -0.175 -0.015 -0.007 -0.038 -0.016 
  -(3.76) -(2.37) -(2.80) -(3.61) -(3.94) 
       
P-value χ
2 test that 
province dummies are 
jointly  zero  0.000 0.919 0.887 0.007 0.004 
# of observations  3376 3394 3394 3394 3394 
* dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 for Probit specification. 
† The number in the table is the estimated coefficient multiplied by 1,000. 
Notes:  Estimates also include dummy variables for provinces.  The correlation is between the rainfall shocks in the 
sending and receiving provinces.  Independent variables are characteristics of the head of the household.   
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TABLE 5.B 
RECEIVERS 




s > 0 
Gambling 
expenditure















s / Total 
expenditure
s 
Independent Variables  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Income per Capita†   0.055  0.007  0.001  0.015  0.004 
  (5.03) (6.02) (1.62) (6.81) (4.01) 
Male Household Head  0.257 0.014 0.005 0.052 0.022 
  (5.62) (2.62) (2.27) (4.77) (4.63) 
Age  0.048 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.004 
  (5.94) (1.65) (1.02) (4.76) (4.36) 
Age
2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  -(6.39) -(1.87) -(1.22) -(5.15) -(4.74) 
Years of Schooling  0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.69) -(1.25) -(0.48) -(0.16) (0.27) 
Household Size  0.091 -0.001 0.000 0.011 0.005 
  (7.48) -(0.44) (0.24) (3.91) (4.42) 
Urban Dummy  0.189 0.011 0.004 0.039 0.017 
  (3.15) (1.59) (1.42) (2.84) (2.71) 
Correlation b/w sending  -0.040  -0.009  -0.003  -0.019  -0.007 
and receiving province  -(0.86)  -(1.70)  -(1.22)  -(1.76)  -(1.45) 
Distance b/w sending  -0.076  -0.002  0.001  -0.010  -0.001 
and receiving province†  -(0.87)  -(0.22)  (0.32)  -(0.51)  -(0.15) 
1990  Survey*  -0.155 -0.009 -0.004 -0.034 -0.015 
  -(3.63) -(1.89) -(1.72) -(3.36) -(3.29) 
       
P-value χ
2 test that 
province dummies are 
jointly  zero  0.000 0.735 0.655 0.000 0.000 
# of observations  4101 4102 4102 4102 4102 
* dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 for Probit specification. 
† The number in the table is the estimated coefficient multiplied by 1,000. 
Notes:  Estimates also include dummy variables for provinces.  The correlation is between the rainfall shocks in the 
sending and receiving provinces.  Independent variables are characteristics of the head of the household.  1 
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